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SPOUSAL SUPPORT TAKES ON THE MOMMY TRACK: WHY THE ALI
PROPOSAL IS GOOD FOR WORKING MOTHERS
TONYA L. BRITO*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Buried within the nearly two hundred pages of the American Law Insti-
tute’s chapter on compensatory spousal support payments is important infor-
mation for working mothers: Section 5.06 provides a recovery for a working
spouse who has been the primary caretaker of a child of the marriage.  Many
mothers cut back on their work schedules or make career sacrifices in order to
devote time to child rearing.  Women who balance the work-family conflict in
this manner often find that they are on the “mommy track,” a slower career path
providing fewer opportunities for advancement and salary growth.1  Even
though fathers and children may benefit from these arrangements while a fam-
ily is intact, it is women who have borne the entire cost of these decisions at di-
vorce because the law has primarily treated the wife’s career sacrifices as a
“gift.”
At divorce, many mothers and their children face a significant drop in their
standard of living.  Even working mothers experience financial loss at divorce.
Although such women have remained in the labor force, they often experience a
reduction to their earning capacity as a result of their greater investment in child
rearing during marriage.  But upon divorce, their employment status typically
disqualifies them from receiving a need-based spousal support award.  Conse-
quently, any reduction to earning capacity has gone uncompensated.
Under the ALI draft, which reconceptualizes alimony as compensatory
payments for losses arising from the marriage and its failure, a working
mother’s career loss would provide a ground for spousal support.  According to
the reporters, this proposal is premised on two principles: first, that caretaking is
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who seek to balance family responsibilities and work demands rather than putting their careers first.
See Felice N. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1989,
at 65.  Schwartz’s proposal was controversial and set off a debate that continues today.
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the responsibility of both parents and, second, that the spouse who assumes a
greater portion of caretaking during marriage should not bear the full cost of
any resultant career damage.  Adoption of Section 5.06 would have a broad im-
pact on divorce law because most married mothers today work outside the
home and most marriages end in divorce.  The proposal also has implications
beyond the compensation of women for their contributions during marriage.  It
challenges cultural and social norms in the United States that overlook the sig-
nificant family responsibilities of workers and devalue child rearing.  It reflects
the view that caretaking is a joint parental responsibility and that the primary
caretaker of children provides a social good worthy of compensation.  In so do-
ing, the proposal runs counter to societal assumptions that elevate market work
over family work.
II.  THE ALI’S TREATMENT OF THE PRIMARY CARETAKER SPOUSE
Current rules governing alimony and spousal support are largely incoher-
ent and lack a sustaining rationale.  They have been the subjects of much schol-
arly criticism.  The drafters of the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution have
sought to bring certainty and fairness to this area of the law by transforming
alimony from a need-based into an entitlement-based regime and dramatically
reducing judicial discretion through imposition of guidelines for determining
spousal support payments.  The ALI drafters identify several ways a spouse
may become entitled to compensatory payments.2  Spousal support is permitted
for: 1) the loss in marital living standard in a marriage of significant duration;3 2)
for the loss in earning capacity incurred by the primary caretaker of children;4 3)
for the loss in earning capacity resulting from the care of a sick, elderly or dis-
abled third parties (to whom the spouse(s) owe a moral obligation);5 4) to reim-
burse a spouse for contributions to the other spouse’s education or training in
short-term marriages;6 and 5) to restore a spouse to their premarital living stan-
dard.7  The reporters thus have attempted to formulate those instances when it is
appropriate to compensate spouses for financial losses arising from divorce.
The relevant question is whether the divorcing spouse is entitled to post-divorce
support under one of the categories listed above rather than whether the spouse
can demonstrate economic need to justify an award of alimony.
This Commentary focuses on Section 5.06 of the ALI draft, the most crea-
tive and innovative portion of the proposed law.  Section 5.06 compensates a
spouse whose earning capacity at divorce is less than it would have been had he
or she not been the primary caretaker of the couple’s children during the mar-
riage.  The caretaking spouse qualifies if certain criteria are satisfied.  First,
marital children must have lived in the claimant’s household for the minimum
period provided by the rule.  Second, the claimant’s earning capacity at divorce
2. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 5
(Proposed Final Draft Part I, 1997) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 1997].
3. Id. § 5.05.
4. Id. § 5.06.
5. Id. § 5.12.
6. Id. § 5.15.
7. Id. § 5.16.
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must be substantially less than that of the other spouse.  When these criteria are
met, the rule presumes that the claimant provided a disproportionate share of
the childcare during the marriage.  The other spouse may rebut this presump-
tion by presenting evidence that the claimant did not in fact provide a dispro-
portionate share during marriage of the care of the marital children.  The other
spouse may not, however, rebut the presumption that childcare responsibilities
adversely impacted the claimant’s earning capacity.  The ALI drafters point to
the difficulty of making individualized determinations of career damage as a
justification for prohibiting a rebuttal of this inference.
The value of a spousal support award available under Section 5.06 is de-
termined by reference to a standard formula.  The amount of the award would
be calculated by multiplying the difference between the post-divorce incomes of
the spouses by a “childcare durational factor.”  The ALI drafters leave it to the
implementing jurisdiction to specify what the childcare durational factor will be,
but point out that it should increase with the duration of the time period during
which the claimant was the primary caretaker.  Under section 5.06, the duration
of an award is determined by multiplying the childcare period by a specified
factor established by the state legislature.8  The ALI drafters assume that as the
childcare period increases, so does the impact on the primary caretaker’s earn-
ing capacity.  The net effect of the proposal is to create a uniform statewide rule
that would yield more consistency and reliability in determining spousal sup-
port awards.
III.  THE ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE OF WORKING MOTHERS AND THEIR
VULNERABILITY AT DIVORCE
Alimony has never been a sure thing.  Yet, the former wives most likely to
get a post-divorce award have been women who fit the patriarchal homemaker
model.  The alimony cases have a familiar ring to them—the wife selflessly de-
voted decades of her life to her husband and children and she is left at divorce
with grown-up children, minimal job skills and a paltry earning capacity.  Her
spouse, on the other hand, has heavily invested in his career and can walk away
from the marriage with his enhanced earning capacity intact.  These wives de-
serve and get awards and the cases providing generous awards to homemakers
in long-term marriages commonly stress their sacrifice in financial independ-
ence arising from focusing on homemaking tasks.  The law here is well-settled
and uncontroversial.
The traditional rule of alimony—providing need-based awards after dis-
solution of a long-term marriage in which one spouse was a homemaker—does
not fit most divorcing couples today.  Work and family patterns have changed
dramatically over the past thirty years.  While the traditional family model per-
sists in society, only ten percent of married couples adopt the Ozzie and Harriet
pattern over the long term.  The vast majority of married couples do not divide
their labor according to the strict gender-based male breadwinner/female
8. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 2, § 5.07.
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homemaker model.  Indeed, most married couples with children are dual-career
couples.9
Part of the growing concern over balancing work and family responsibili-
ties is fueled by the growth of dual-earner couples with children.  Over the past
twenty-five years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of married
mothers who are in the labor force.  Today two-thirds of all married mothers
work outside the home.  Yet, studies show that it is mothers and not fathers who
perform most of the caretaking and housework.10  Because few traditional full-
time jobs provide the autonomy and flexibility to allow workers to balance work
and family effectively, many mothers turn to alternatives such as flextime, job
sharing, self-employment, part-year positions and temporary work.  Mothers
also manage the work-family conflict by taking breaks from market work or re-
ducing the number of hours they work.  For example, within married couples,
over 40 percent of mothers with children under the age of three are not in the
labor force and about a third of those that do work outside the home are en-
gaged in part-time employment.11  Part-time employment among fathers, on the
other hand, is very rare.12  The caretaking provided on the homefront by work-
ing mothers has an adverse impact on their earning capacity, whether the
woman temporarily withdraws from the labor force, works part-time or works
full-time.  Career disruptions such as these place many mothers on the lower
wage “mommy track”13 and contributes to the wage gap between working
mothers and all others in the labor force.  The ALI draft recounts similar studies
showing that “their disproportionate responsibility for care of children is by far
the most important single factor explaining the difference in the earnings of men
and women, swamping all other possible factors including discrimination by
employers”.14
The wage differential between fathers and mothers transforms upon di-
vorce into an even more dramatic disparity between their post-divorce incomes.
Researchers consistently have documented a sharp fall in mothers’ economic
position and a rise in fathers’ after divorce.15  Modern day alimony rules (re-
9. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES IN 1999, LABOR FORCE
STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY tbl.1 (2000), available at http://stats.bls.gov/
news.release/famee.nr0.htm (“In 1999, both parents were employed in 64.1% of married-couple
families with children under 18, while the father, but not the mother, was employed in 29.1% of
these families.”).
10. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT
HOME 22-32 (1989)(coining phrase ‘Second Shift Mom’ for proposition that, in two-job marriages,
wives continue to do bulk of household work and chores).
11. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 9, at tbl. 6, available at http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/
famee.t06.htm (showing employment status of mothers with own children under 3 years old by sin-
gle year of age of youngest child, and marital status, using 1998-99 annual averages).
12. Id. at tbl. 5 (showing that 96.8% of working fathers with children under six years of age are
engaged in full-time employment).
13. For example, part-time workers “average fifty-eight cents on each dollar earned by full-time
workers per hour worked . . . and frequently are cut off from career advancement.”  Joan Williams,
Afterword: Exploring the Economic Meanings of Gender, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 987, 992-93 (2000).
14. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 2, § 5.06 cmt. d, reporter’s note at 336 (citing VICTOR FUCHS,
WOMEN’S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY (1988)).
15. Although researchers have reached differing conclusions about the degree of the disparity,
their studies consistently show that there is a significant gender gap in the financial consequences of
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flecting the social reality that most women are in the labor force) have adapted
to provide payments designed to “rehabilitate” ex-wives to economic self-
sufficiency rather than to address the economic marginalization of working
mothers.  Temporary maintenance awards have become the norm in family law.
These awards are designed to provide transitional support for women who lack
the skills or work experience needed to pursue market work. Like alimony,
maintenance awards have generally been need-based.
Need-based alimony rules have not provided working moms with a reli-
able source of post-divorce support.  The ALI draft points out that need-based
standards overlook income disparities between divorcing spouses and provide
examples of court decisions rejecting claims for alimony by spouses who are ca-
pable of self-support.  The Louise v. Louise16 case, cited in the draft, provides a
clear example.  After twenty-three years of marriage, the couple divorced.  Al-
though they were both schoolteachers, the husband earned considerably more
than the wife because she had taken a ten-year break from teaching to raise their
children.  At the time of their divorce, the husband earned $40,000 and the wife
earned $28,000.  The court acknowledged that the wife suffered a loss to her
earning capacity because of her temporary withdrawal from the labor force.  It
stated that the spouses’ “salaries would have been approximately the same” if
the wife had pursued her career throughout the marriage as the husband had.17
Despite the wife’s career damage, the court reversed a trial court maintenance
award finding that maintenance was unwarranted because the wife could get on
quite well on her income.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The ALI’s proposal on compensatory spousal payments promises the eq-
uitable reallocation of financial loss at divorce, but it actually does much more
than that.  Section 5.06 recasts caretaking of children and financial support of the
family as the joint responsibilities of the husband and wife.  It recognizes that
although spouses have a joint responsibility for each of these duties, many mar-
ried couples divide the duties in a traditional way even today—with the wife
fulfilling most of the care of their children while the husband fulfils most of their
joint responsibility for the family’s financial support.  The drafters are careful
not to prefer one family form over another, but instead recognize that a parent
who assumes the responsibilities of primary caretaker of the children often lim-
its her market labor during this period, and this limitation typically results in a
residual loss of earning capacity that continues beyond the caretaking period.
divorce.  See, e.g., Richard R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM.
SOC. REV. 528 (1996) (finding a twenty-seven percent decline in wives’ post-divorce standard of liv-
ing, and a ten percent increase in husbands’ living standards); Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan,
What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988) (at divorce, wives experi-
enced a thirty-three percent decline in their living standard).  See also, Joan Williams, Gender Wars:
Selfless Woman in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1603-04 n. 252 (1991) (“The Census
Bureau followed 20,000 households for 32 months and reported a 37% income drop for mothers
which, when adjusted for the drop in family size, reflects a 26% loss overall.”).
16. 549 N.Y.S.2d 238 (App. Div. 1989).
17. Id. at 239.
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The proposal ensures that at divorce, the primary caretaker will not bear the en-
tire cost of this division of labor.
The spousal support provisions of the ALI draft can have tremendous sig-
nificance for the working mothers who stand to benefit economically from the
proposal.  They would reduce the extent to which primary caretaker parents,
still predominately women, have been required by alimony law to bear a dis-
proportionate amount of the marriage-caused economic hardships at divorce.
However, beyond these individual benefits, the proposal has the capacity to ex-
ert important social effects as well.  The ALI proposal implicitly recognizes that
child rearing has long been women’s work, and as such is devalued in American
society.  The ALI drafters contend that both parents have a “special responsibil-
ity” and a “legal obligation” to provide care for their children and that parents
ought to share any financial loss to earning capacity that caretaking creates.18
The ALI drafters take on the work/family conflict in the form of the mommy
track and their spousal support provisions serve as a challenge to the marginali-
zation of caregiving.
18. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 2, § 5.06 cmt. c, reporter’s note at 332.
